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Using a broad panel of advanced economies we document that increases in
GDP per capita are associated with a systematic shift in the composition of
value added to sectors that are intensive in high-skill labor, a process we label
as skill-biased structural change. It follows that further development in these
economies leads to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. We
develop a quantitative two-sector model of this process as a laboratory to assess
the sources of the rise of the skill premium in the US and a set of ten other
advanced economies, over the period 1977 to 2005. For the US, we find that the
sector-specific skill neutral component of technical change accounts for 18-24%
of the overall increase of the skill premium due to technical change, and that
the mechanism through which this component of technical change affects the
skill premium is via skill biased structural change.
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1 Introduction
The substantial increase in the wages of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled
workers is one of the most prominent secular trends in the US and other advanced
economies. A large literature that seeks to isolate the underlying driving forces and
propagation mechanisms behind this trend has consistently concluded that skill-biased
technological change (SBTC) is a quantitatively important driver of this increase.1
In this paper we argue that a distinct process – which we label skill-biased structural
change – has also played a quantitatively important role. We use the term skill biased
structural change to describe the systematic reallocation of sectoral value added shares
toward relatively skill intensive industries that accompanies the growth process among
advanced economies and that is driven by sector-specific skill-neutral technical change.
The economic intuition behind our finding is simple. If (as we show is indeed the
case in the next section) the process of development is systematically associated with
a shift in the composition of value added toward sectors that are intensive in high-
skill workers, then the relative demand for high-skilled workers will increase, even
if development is driven by the skill-neutral component of technical change. This
channel is absent in analyses that adopt an aggregate production function, since in
that case the skill-neutral component of technical change has no effect on the relative
demand for high-skilled workers.
Our argument proceeds in four steps. We first develop a simple general equilibrium
model of structural change that incorporates an important role for skill. To best
highlight the shift in value added to relatively skill intensive sectors, we study a
two-sector model in which the two sectors are distinguished by their intensity of
skilled workers in production. We allow for sector-specific technological change, and
decompose technological change in each sector into a skill-neutral component and a
skill-biased component. The skill-biased component captures technological change
that affects relative marginal products holding inputs fixed, while the skill neutral
component captures technical change that affects the amount of output holding inputs
1Important early contributions to the literature on the skill premium that stress skill-biased
technical change include Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Murphy and Welch
(1992), Berman et al. (1994) and Berman et al. (1998). This is not to say that SBTC is the only factor
at work, as the literature has also highlighted the effect of other factors on overall wage inequality.
For example, DiNardo et al. (1996) argue that labor market institutions such as minimum wages
and unionization have played an important role in shaping wage inequality overall, Feenstra and
Hanson (1999) emphasize the role of offshoring, and Autor et al. (2013) emphasize the role of trade.
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fixed. This decomposition is of interest precisely because of the fact that in one-
sector models the skill premium depends only on the skill-biased component and is
independent of whether total output is affected. We derive a log linear approximation
for a special case of our model and show that changes in the sector-specific skill-
neutral component of technical change can impact the skill premium, and that the
lone mechanism through which this happens is by reallocating activity across sectors
that differ in their skill intensity.
In the second step, we use the model to study the evolution of the skill premium in
the US economy between 1977 and 2005. We assume that the only exogenous driving
forces are technical change and changes in the relative supply of skilled workers. We
measure the change in the relative supply of skill directly from the data. We show how
the model can be used to infer preference parameters and the components of technical
change using data on the growth in aggregate output, relative sectoral prices and the
distribution of sectoral value added, the skill premium and changes in sectoral factor
shares. Importantly, our calibrated model perfectly matches the observed increase in
the skill premium, which rises from 1.33 to 1.88 between 1977 and 2005.
In the third step we use our model to decompose the overall increase of the skill
premium into four components: one due to the change in the relative supply of
high-skill workers, a second due to skill-biased technical change, a third due to sector-
specific skill-neutral change, and a fourth term that represents the interaction between
the two types of technical change. If there had been no technical change, our model
predicts that the increase in the relative supply of high-skill workers would have
lowered the skill premium to 0.87, a drop of 46 percentage points. It follows that
technical change created an increase in the skill premium of 101 percentage points.
In our benchmark specification, between 18 and 24 percent of this increase comes
from changes in the sector-specific skill-neutral component of technological change.2
The fourth and final step quantifies the mechanism through which the sector-
specific skill-neutral component of technical change affects the skill premium. We
show that this component drives the rise in the size of the high skill-intensive sector;
in fact, in its absence, the value added share of the skill-intensive sector would have
decreased modestly. The sector-specific skill-neutral component of technical change
is also the dominant source of increases in output in our model. We conclude that
systematic changes in the composition of value added associated with the process
2The range of estimates reflects the effect of varying the allocation of the interaction term.
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of development are an important mechanism in accounting for the rise in the skill
premium.
To assess the importance of skill-biased structural change more broadly we repeat
the analysis for a set of ten other OECD countries. While the contribution of the
sector-specific skill-neutral component of technical change varies across countries,
ranging from around 15 percent to almost 50 percent, the median for this sample is
23 percent, very much in line with our estimates for the US.
Our paper is related to many others in two large and distinct literatures, one on
SBTC and the skill premium and the other on structural transformation. Important
early contributions to the literature on the skill premium include Katz and Murphy
(1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992), Berman et al. (1994)
and Berman et al. (1998). These papers emphasized the role of SBTC because the
increase in the skill premium occurred despite a large increase in the relative supply
of high-skill workers, and they could not identify other factors that would lead to a
large increase in the relative demand for high-skill workers. In particular, while each
of them noted compositional changes in demand as a potentially important factor,
none of them found this channel to be of first order importance.
Relative to this literature, our contribution is fourfold. First, we analyze the evo-
lution of the skill premium in general equilibrium in a multi-sector economy. Second,
we decompose technological change into sector-specific skill-biased and skill-neutral
components and assess the contribution of each component to the evolution of the
skill premium. Third, we find a large role for the skill-neutral component of technical
change and show that the key mechanism through which it affects the skill premium
is via structural change. Fourth, we link the driving forces of this structural change
to the process of development. In Section 6, we detail the key reasons that our model
based approach leads to a different conclusion than the shift-share approach followed
by Katz and Murphy (1992).
An early contribution in the second literature is Baumol (1967), with more re-
cent contributions by Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007). (See
Herrendorf et al. (2014) for a recent overview.) Relative to this literature our main
contribution is to introduce heterogeneity in worker skill levels into the analysis and
to organize industries by skill intensity rather than broad sectors. Caselli and Cole-
man (2001) is an early paper linking structural transformation and human capital.
Differently than us, they focus on the movement of resources out of agriculture and
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into non-agriculture, and assume that the non-agricultural sector uses only skilled
labor.
Two closely related papers to ours are Buera and Kaboski (2012) and Leonardi
(2015). Buera and Kaboski (2012) also study the interaction between development
and the demand for skill both empirically and theoretically, but their primary theo-
retical contribution is conceptual, building a somewhat abstract model to illustrate
the mechanism. Relative to them we make three contributions. First, we document
the empirical patterns for a larger set of countries and along additional dimensions.
Second, we develop a model that nests the benchmark quantitative models used to
study the skill premium and structural change in isolation. Their model did not in-
clude sector-specific technical progress, the driving force behind structural change in
our model. Third, we use the model to quantitatively assess the contribution of the
sector-specific, skill-neutral component of technical change.
Leonardi (2015) also considers how changes in primitives are propagated via struc-
tural change to generate changes in the skill premium. But whereas we focus on the
effect of the skill-neutral component of technical change and find significant effects,
he focuses on changes in educational attainment and finds relatively small effects. In
Section 6 we show that our model predicts similarly small effects for the change that
he focuses on.
Our model structure is broadly similar to that of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
Like us, they study the relationship between development and structural change in a
model that features heterogeneity in factor intensities across sectors. But whereas we
focus on differential intensities of human capital, they focus on differential intensities
of physical capital. Cravino and Sotelo (2019) use a framework similar to ours to
show how reductions in trade costs affect demand composition and the demand for
skill. Cerina et al. (2018) incorporates skill-biased technical change into a model of
structural change. Their focus is on labor market polarization and the role of gender
differences.3
An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 documents the prevalence of skill
biased structural change in a panel of advanced economies, and evidence suggestive
of the mechanisms that drive it. Section 3 presents our general equilibrium model
3Ngai and Petrongolo (2014) use a similar framework to show that compositional changes in value
added associated with development can explain part of the decrease in the gender wage gap that
has occurred in the US over time.
5
and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 shows how the model can be used to
account for the evolution of the US economy over the period 1977 to 2005, and in
particular how the data can be used to infer preference parameters and the process
of technical change. Section 5 presents our main results about the role of different
driving forces on the evolution of the skill premium, and the relation between the skill-
neutral component of technical change and structural change. Section 6 discusses the
relationship of our results to earlier results in the literature. Section 7 reports results
for several sensitivity exercises. Section 8 extends the analysis to a set of nine other
countries and Section 9 concludes.
2 Skill-Biased Structural Change: Empirics
This section establishes skill-biased structural change as a robust feature of the data
for advanced economies. Using data for a broad panel of advanced economies, we doc-
ument a strong positive correlation in the time series between the level of development
in an economy, as measured by GDP per capita, and the share of economic activity
accounted for by the relatively skill-intensive sector. The traditional structural change
literature documents patterns both in terms of output value added shares as well as
employment shares. Similarly, we find that this pattern holds whether we measure
the size of the skill-intensive sector in terms of its output value-added share or its
share of overall labor compensation. This relationship is robust across countries, and
in particular, the experience of the US is very similar to the average pattern found in
the data.
The structural change literature emphasizes two key mechanisms: relative price
effects and income effects. We document that both of these mechanisms seem relevant
for understanding the increasing size of the skill-intensive sector. First, using cross-
country data we document a strong positive correlation in the time series between
the level of development and the price of the skill-intensive sector relative to other
goods and services. Once again, this relationship is robust across countries and the
experience of the US is similar to the average pattern.
Second, to document the potential importance of income effects we supplement
the aggregate time series panel analysis with evidence on cross-sectional expenditure
shares in the US economy. We show that the expenditure of higher income households
contains a higher share of value added from the skill-intensive sector.
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2.1 Data Sources
The facts reported in this section are based on several datasets. Sectoral value-
added shares, sectoral compensation shares and relative sectoral prices come from
the EUKLEMS Database (“Basic Table”).4 These data exist in comparable form for
a panel of countries over the years 1970-2005. The sectoral data are available at
roughly the 1 to 2-digit industry level. Our focus is on advanced economies’ growth
experience, so following Buera and Kaboski (2012), we focus on the 15 countries with
income per capita of at least 9,200 Gheary-Khamis 1990 international dollars at the
beginning of the panel in 1970.5 Cross-country data for real (chain-weighted) GDP
per capita data is from the Penn World Tables 9.0.
Labor compensation data come from the EUKLEMS Labour Input Data. This
dataset reports the share of sectoral labor compensation that goes to different skill
groups. We define the high-skill group to be those with a college degree or more and
define the low-skill group to be all other workers.
Our analysis of US micro data is based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), a cross-section data set on household expenditure. This dataset reports house-
hold expenditure on final expenditure categories and not value-added categories. To
create consistent measures we map household expenditure data through the input-
output system to determine the consumption shares of value added. We briefly sketch
the steps of this procedure here, and provide more details in the Online Appendix.
We start with the household level CEX data for the United States from 2012 and
clean the data as in Aguiar and Bils (2015). We adapt a Bureau of Labor Statistics
mapping from disaggregated CEX categories to 76 NIPA Personal Consumption Ex-
penditure (PCE) categories and then utilize a Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
mapping of these 76 PCE categories to 69 input-output industries that properly at-
tributes the components going to distribution margins (disaggregated transportation,
retail, and wholesale categories). Using the 2012 BEA input-output matrices, we
can then infer the quantity of value added of each industry embodied in the CEX
expenditures. In our empirical work we restrict ourselves to the primary interview
sample, respondents age 24-65 with complete income records, and each observation
4See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
5These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We
exclude Luxembourg given its small size. The U.S. data for value added go back to only 1977, while
the Japan data go back to only 1973.
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is a household-quarter observation.
2.2 Defining the Skill-Intensive Sector
Both our empirical and theoretical analysis will focus on an aggregation of sectors
into two bins based on skill intensity: a high-skill intensive sector and a low-skill
intensive sector. An important first step is to assign individual sectors to these two
broad categories. Our primary metric for assessing skill intensity is the share of total
sectoral labor compensation that goes to high-skill workers.6 Importantly, the ranking
of sectors via this criterion is quite stable over time, so that relative skill intensity can
safely be viewed as fixed characteristic of a sector over the period of our analysis.7
Creating a binary characterization requires that one adopts a boundary between
the high- and low-skill intensive sectors. The benchmark results that we report in
this paper are based on defining the skill-intensive sector as consisting of Education,
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities, Financial In-
termediation, and Health and Social Work. These four sectors have both the highest
average value for their high-skill compensation shares as well as the highest average
ranking in the distribution of high-skill compensation shares. In terms of average
ranks over the 1977-2005 period, the above four sectors have values of 1.6, 2.4, 3.3
and 4.5 respectively. The next two highest are Chemicals and Chemical Products
(5.1) and Real Estate (5.8). In terms of average high-skill compensation shares our
four sectors have values of 0.753, 0.528, 0.506, and 0.466. The next two highest are
Chemicals and Chemical Products (0.446), and Real Estate (0.434). No other sector
has an average above 0.40.
The Real Estate sector merits some discussion. Although this sector ranks quite
highly, we have chosen to exclude it from our benchmark definition of the skill-
intensive sector. Because this sector has very little employment, its assignment is
effectively inconsequential from the perspective of labor variables. But this sector
has increased in terms of its value added share since 1977, so including it in the
skill-intensive sector would raise the measured increase in the value-added share of
the skill-intensive sector. This would serve to increase the size of the effects that
6We have also considered the share of total hours or employment accounted for high-skill workers.
These alternatives are all highly correlated with our baseline metric based on compensation shares
and so do not suggest an alternative ranking. See the Online Appendix for more details.
7See the Online Appendix for more details on this.
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we estimate, but we feel that this effect is somewhat misleading. For this reason we
have decided to err on the side of being conservative and not include Real Estate
in our benchmark specification. Because Real Estate and Chemicals and Chemical
Products are similarly ranked, we have also chosen to exclude both in our benchmark
specification.
However, to assess the possibility that our results are influenced by where we draw
the boundary between the two sectors, we have also done our analysis using two more
expansive definitions of the skill-intensive sector, one that includes Real Estate and
Chemical and Chemical Products, and another that further includes the next two
highest ranking sectors, Electrical and Optical Equipment (average rank 7.3) and
Public Administration and Defense (average rank 8.1). Using either of these more
expansive definition does not affect our main message. Results are included in the
Online Appendix.
While our empirical analysis of aggregate time series data is closely related to
that in Buera and Kaboski (2012) there is a key difference. They divided industries
within the service sector into two mutually exclusive groups: a high-skill intensive
group and a low-skill intensive group, and show that whereas the value added share
of the high-skill intensive group rose substantially between 1950 and 2000, the value-
added share of the low-skill intensive group actually fell over the same time period.
In contrast to them, we split the entire economy into a high-skill intensive group and
a low-skill intensive group, and not just the service sector. While in our benchmark
specification the skill-intensive sector consists exclusively of service sectors, our more
expansive definitions also include some goods producing sectors. But importantly, to
assess how structural change affects the aggregate demand for skill, one must include
the contribution of all sectors and not just those within services. Another difference
from Buera and Kaboski (2012) is that we also report cross-sectional micro evidence
on income effects.
2.3 Skill-Biased Structural Change
In this subsection we document the phenomenon of skill-biased structural change,
i.e., the systematic increase in the relative size of the skill-intensive sector that ac-
companies development.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between development, as proxied by real GDP per
9
Figure 1: Structural Change by Skill Intensity and Economic Development.
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capita and the rise of the skill-intensive sector.8 We use two different measures for the
size of the skill-intensive sector: its share of total labor compensation, and its share of
total value added. Labor compensation is more relevant from the perspective of labor
demand, but value added is the more typical metric for theories of structural change.
We include country-level fixed effects with the US being the excluded country. The
left panel of Figure 1 shows the relationship using labor compensation, while the
right panel shows the relationship using value added. The small squares show the
relationship for countries other than the US, and the larger circles represent data for
the US.
Both panels lead to the same conclusion: the relative size of the skill-intensive
sector increases with log GDP per capita, with highly significant (at 0.1 percent
levels) semi-elasticities of 0.21 and 0.15 respectively.9 The regression line implies an
increase of roughly 30 percentage points of labor compensation and 20 percentage
8The analogous figures for the more expansive definition of the skill-intensive sector are contained
in the Online Appendix.
9The R2 values for these regressions are 0.93 and 0.92. If we exclude log GDP per capita and
only have fixed effects the R2 values are 0.48 and 0.49, indicating the time series variation in GDP
per capita accounts for a large part of the time series variation in the size of the high-skill sector.
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points of value added, as we move from a GDP per capita of 10, 000 to 40, 000 (in
2005 PPP terms).10 Moreover, we see that the relationship found in the US data is
quite similar to the overall relationship. Indeed, the tight relationship suggests that
from the perspective of time series changes, cross-country differences in the details
for funding of education or health, for example, are second order relative to the
income per capita relationship in terms of their effects. (Recall that we have removed
country fixed effects in Figure 1.) In sum, the tendency for economic activity to move
toward skill-intensive industries as an economy develops is a robust pattern in the
cross-country data.
2.4 Structural Change Mechanisms
One common explanation for structural change is changes in relative prices (see, for
example, Baumol, 1967; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007). Using value added price indices
from the EUKLEMS Database, we examine the correlation between changes in the
relative price of the skill-intensive sector and the changes in its value added share
that accompanies the process of development.11 Figure 2 is analogous to Figure 1,
but plots the value added price index of the high skill-intensive sector relative to the
low skill-intensive sector.12 We have again taken out country fixed effects, and have
normalized the relative price indices to 100 in 1995. As before, the larger circles
represent the U.S. data.
Figure 2 reveals a strong positive relationship between the relative price of the
skill-intensive sector and development.13 In this case the relationship in the US data
is a bit steeper than in the overall data set, but the strong relationship exists even
abstracting from the US. We conclude that changes in relative prices are another
robust feature of the structural transformation process involving the movement of
activity toward the skill-intensive sector.
A second common explanation for structural change is income effects associated
with non-homothetic preferences (see, for example, Kongsamut et al., 2001). With
10The fact that the semi-elasticity for compensation is significantly higher than for value added
will be relevant when we compare our findings with those of Katz and Murphy (1992) later in the
paper.
11We construct sector-level aggregate indices as chain-weighted Fisher price indices of the price
indices for individual industries. Calculation details are available in the Online Appendix.
12The analogous figure for the more expansive definition of the high-skill sector is contained in
the Online Appendix.
13The R2 for this regression is 0.76. If we exclude log GDP per capita the R2 is only 0.10.
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Figure 2: Relative Price of Skill-intensive Sector and Economic Development.
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this in mind it is of interest to ask whether the output of the skill-intensive sector is a
luxury good, i.e., has an income elasticity that exceeds one. To pursue this we examine
the relationship between the skill intensity of value-added consumption and income
in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).14 To the extent that all households
face the same prices at a given point in time and have common preferences (or at
least preferences that are not directly correlated with income), the cross-sectional
expenditure patterns within a country abstract from the relative price relationship in
Figure 2 and allow us to focus on the effect of income holding prices constant.
Having constructed household level value added consumption expenditure shares
as noted earlier, we regress this share on household observables, most importantly
income or education, and potentially a host of other household level controls. Our
analysis is similar in spirit to that in Aguiar and Bils (2015) with two exceptions.15
First, they do not consider our two-sector skill-intensity aggregation, and second,
14Leonardi (2015) carries out a closely related exercise and concludes that higher income and more
educated individuals have higher expenditure shares on final expenditure categories that rely more
on high-skill workers, even when taking intermediate input use into account.
15This exercise is also related to the analysis in Leonardi (2015).
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they study final expenditure elasticities whereas we consider value added expenditure
elasticities.
Table 1 presents results for regressions of the total share of expenditures that is
derived from the skill-intensive sector. The first column presents results from an OLS
regression on log after tax income and a set of demographic controls, including age,
age squared, dummies for sex, race, state, urban, and month, and values capturing
household composition (number of boys aged 2-16, number of girls aged 2-16, number
of men over 16, number of women over 16 years, and number of children less than
2 years). The coefficient on log income in the first column indicates that the semi-
elasticity of the skill-intensive share of value added embodied in expenditures is 0.030.
The second column replaces log income with the log of total expenditures, and finds
a larger semi-elasticity of 0.050.16
Table 1
Household Skill-Intensive Expenditure Share vs. Income or Total Expenditures
OLS OLS IV IV OLS
Ln Income 0.030∗∗∗ - 0.054∗∗∗ - -
(0.001) - (0.002) - -
Ln Expenditures - 0.050∗∗∗ - 0.081∗∗∗ -
- (0.002) - (0.002) -
High-skill Head - - - - 0.047∗∗∗
- - - - (0.002)
R2 0.19 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.18
Observations 13, 144 13, 210 13, 144 13, 210 4, 056
1 *** indicate significance at the 1 percent level.
2 Standard errors are in parenthesis. Controls include: age; age squared; dummies for sex, race,
state, urban, and month; number of boys (2-16 year); number of girls (2-16 years); number
of men (over 16 years); number of women (over 16 years); and number of infants (less than 2
years). High-skill is defined as 16 years of schooling attained, while low-skill is defined as 12
years attained. Sample includes households with heads aged 25-64 and complete income data.
Both income and expenditure are certainly subject to measurement error, and
even if properly measured, income would only proxy for permanent income, leading
to a likely attenuation bias. The third and fourth columns attempt to alleviate this
measurement error by instrumenting for log income or log expenditures, respectively,
16The larger coefficient for expenditures may be driven by certain lumpy expenditures like higher
educational expenses and car purchases driving both up in particular months. We nonetheless report
these coefficients for the sake of completeness.
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using the years of schooling attained by the head of household. Instrumenting for
income in this fashion increases the coefficient almost two-fold to 0.054. Likewise,
instrumenting for log total expenditures increases the coefficient by about 60 percent
to 0.081.
The last column uses education as a direct regressor, replacing log income or log
expenditures with a dummy for whether the head of household is high skill or not.
Here high-skill is defined as having exactly 16 years of education, while low-skill is
defined as having exactly 12 years. (The rest of the households are dropped, leading
to the smaller sample size.) The coefficient indicates that the skill-intensive share of
value added embodied in expenditures is 4.7 percentage points higher in households
with a high-skill head.
We have examined the robustness of the results in Table 1 along various dimen-
sions. Table 1 uses “quarterly” expenditures of the household across the three months
they are surveyed, but if we use the monthly data directly, we find nearly identi-
cal results. Dropping demographic controls increases the sample by about twenty
percent, but again the coefficients are essentially unchanged and highly significant.
By defining high-skill as those with at least 16 years of education, and low skill as
those with less than 16 years of education, we expand the sample somewhat; the raw
coefficient is slightly smaller but not dramatically so (0.029 rather than 0.047). The
coefficient remains highly significant. We also examined the diary sample, a smaller
sample with a survey that focuses on higher frequency expenditures. In the diary
data, we estimate the same coefficient for expenditures but the coefficients on income
(0.023 vs. 0.030) and high-skill head (0.022 vs. 0.045) are slightly smaller.17
Recalling that the aggregate time series data in Figure 1 implied a coefficient of
0.17 on log GDP per capita without controlling for changes in relative prices, the
instrumented expenditure coefficient of 0.081 suggests that a significant part of the
aggregate time series effect may be driven by income effects. We therefore take this
as evidence that, in addition to relative prices, non-homotheticities may also play a
role in accounting for the observed pattern of skill-biased structural change
Lastly, we note an important limitation in directly applying the micro elasticity
as an income effect. Because the CEX captures only out-of-pocket expenditures, it
underestimates the true consumption of certain goods like health care (a substantial
17Average monthly expenditures in the diary survey are less than ten percent of the average
monthly expenditures in the interview survey.
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share of which is paid by employers for working individuals and by the government
for those on Medicare), and education (a substantial share of which is paid by govern-
ment).18 This caution notwithstanding, we will use our estimated elasticity of 0.81 in
our calibration exercise as a way to discipline the relative importance of income and
relative price effects.19
2.5 Summary
We have documented a robust relationship in the time series data for advanced
economies regarding the systematic movement of activity into the skill-intensive sec-
tor associated with the process of development. We refer to this process as skill-biased
structural change, so as to emphasize both its connection to the traditional charac-
terization of structural change and the special role of skill intensity. This relationship
is remarkably stable across advanced economies, thus suggesting that it is explained
by some economic forces that are robustly associated with development, with country
specific tax and financing systems not playing a central role in explaining the time
series changes.
The traditional structural change literature emphasizes the role of both income
and relative price changes as drivers of structural change. We have presented evidence
that both of these effects seem relevant in the context of skill-biased structural change
as well.
3 Theoretical Framework
Our analysis emphasizes how intratemporal equilibrium allocations are affected by
changes in the economic environment that operate through changes in income and
relative prices. To capture these interactions in the simplest possible setting, we
18The estimated income semi-elasticity of the share of out-of-pocket insurance is actually sig-
nificantly negative in the CEX data although overall insurance consumption is certainly positive.
Similarly, although the expenditure share income semi-elasticity of higher education is positive, it is
likely understated. Finally, the lack of primary and tertiary expenditures may actually be overstated
in the CEX data because it neglects public expenditures, but we conjecture that this relationship is
small relative to the higher education relationship.
19Boppart (2014) also used micro data to discipline these effects, though he used a different
two-sector aggregation and also studied final expenditure shares rather than value added shares.
Differently from him we will simply use a reduced form elasticity to calibrate our model whereas he
used micro data to estimate structural preference parameters.
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adopt a static, closed economy model with labor as the only factor of production.20
Our model is essentially a two-sector version of a standard structural transformation
model extended to allow for two labor inputs that are distinguished by skill. In this
section, we describe the economy and its equilibrium at a point in time; and derive
analytic expressions that capture the key economic mechanism at work in our model
that connects technical change, structural change, and the skill premium.
3.1 Model
There is a unit measure of households. A fraction f are high-skill, and the remaining
fraction 1−f are low-skill. All households have identical preferences defined over two
commodities. In our quantitative analysis these two commodities will be connected
to the low- and high-skill intensive sectors defined in the previous section. In our
benchmark specification all of the high-skill intensive sectors are services and all
goods sectors are in the low-skill intensive sector. It is notationally convenient to
label the two commodities as goods and services even though what we label as goods
includes some service sectors.











where cG and cS are consumption of goods and services, 0 < aG < 1, c̄S ≥ 0 and
ε > 0. Note that if c̄S > 0, preferences are non-homothetic and, holding prices
constant, the expenditure share on services will be increasing in income.21 This non-
homotheticity is motivated by the cross-sectional analysis in the previous section.
Note that households are assumed to not value leisure, since our focus will be on the
relative prices of labor given observed supplies.
20We later carry out an exercise to assess how changes in net trade flows by sector affect our key
findings.
21This is a simple and common way to create differential income effects across the two consumption
categories. One can also generate non-homothetic demands in other ways. For example, Hall and
Jones (2007) generate an income elasticity for medical spending that exceeds unity through the
implied demand for longevity. Boppart (2014), Swiecki (2017) and Comin et al. (2015) all consider
more general preferences with the common feature being that income effects associated with non-
homotheticities do not vanish asymptotically. This property is likely to be relevant when considering
a sample with countries at very different stages of development. Because we focus on a sample of
predominantly rich countries, we have chosen to work with the simpler preference structure in order
to facilitate transparency of the economic forces at work.
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Each of the two production sectors has a constant returns to scale CES production













where Lj and Hj are inputs of low- and high-skill labor in sector j, respectively, αj
captures skill-biased technical change in sector j and Aj reflects skill-neutral technical
change in sector j. Our benchmark specification assumes that ρ, the elasticity of
substitution between low- and high-skill labor, is the same in both sectors.22
Our representation of technical change merits some discussion. Technical change
in each sector is two-dimensional, and can be represented in many equivalent ways.
Our chosen representation is particularly convenient for the effects that we will empha-
size. Specifically, in settings with an aggregate production function the skill premium
is affected only to the extent that technical change affects the relative marginal prod-
ucts, and is independent of what happens to overall output. Our analysis will focus
on the effects associated with the component of technical change that affects output
without affecting relative marginal products. The above representation is convenient
relative to common alternatives because changes in α will have a first-order effect
on relative marginal products but a dampened effect on output due to the opposing
effects embedded in the specification.23
We emphasize that our representation does not imply that we view changes in the
Aj and the αj as two independent processes; rather, our representation is simply a
decomposition of the process of technical change into two components. Any pattern
of factor augmenting technical change can be decomposed into these two pieces.
Before proceeding to analyze the equilibrium for our model we comment on the
significance of abstracting from capital and trade. By excluding capital we implic-
22We consider the effects of cross-sectional variation in this parameter in the Online Appendix.
23More generally, consider a two factor CRS production function F (H,L). One natural represen-
tation of technical change is F (AHH,ALL). In this case changes in either of the Ai generate first
order effects on both output and relative marginal products. Two alternative representations that
partially address this are to write either AHF (H, ALAH L) or ALF (
AH
AL
H,L). But in each case there is
still a first-order effect of changes in AH/AL on output. While our specification dampens the effect
of skill-biased technical change on output, it does not completely eliminate this effect. We have
carried out a sensitivity exercise in which we allocate part of the change in the Aj to the skill-biased
component, so that both the direct and indirect (i.e., general equilibrium) effect of skill-biased tech-
nical change on aggregate output is exactly equal to zero. This has a modest effect on our results
and so is included in the Online Appendix.
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itly adopt a somewhat reduced form view of skill-biased technological change. For
example, changes in relative demand for skilled labor due to capital-skill complemen-
tarity and changes in the price of equipment (as in Krusell et al., 2000) will show
up in our model as skill-biased technological change. While it is obviously of interest
to understand the underlying mechanics of skill-biased technological change, we be-
lieve our results are strengthened by adopting a more expansive notion of skill-biased
technological change rather than focusing on a particular mechanism.24
Although our benchmark analysis abstracts from trade, it implicitly captures some
potential effects of trade. In particular, changing patterns of trade may affect the
composition of production within the low-skill intensive sector due to specialization.
If this involves specialization in higher skill sectors within our low-skill intensive
sector, our analysis will capture this as skill-biased technical change within the low-
skill intensive sector. That is, part of what we measure as skill-biased structural
change within the low-skill intensive sector may reflect the effects of trade.
A separate issue is that as trade in services has increased over time, it may also
contribute to the changing composition of US production across the low- and high-
skill intensive sectors. In Section 7.2 we carry out an exercise to assess the importance
of this effect.
3.2 Equilibrium
We focus on a competitive equilibrium for the above economy. The competitive
equilibrium will feature four markets: two factor markets (low- and high-skill labor)
and two output markets (goods and services), with prices denoted as wL, wH , pG and
pS. We will later normalize the price of low-skill labor to unity so that the price of
high-skill labor will also represent the skill premium.
The definition of competitive equilibrium for this model is completely standard,













pGcGi + pScSi = wi. (1)
24Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) emphasize that capital accumulation may also be a cause of
structural change. In our framework these effects will be captured by changes in the Aj .
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Using the first-order conditions of this problem and normalizing wL to unity, the
aggregate expenditure share for services, denoted by eS satisfies:
eS =
pS [(1− f)cSL + fcSH ]




















1− f + fwH
 . (2)
This expression illustrates the two forces driving structural change from the perspec-
tive of the household: relative prices and income. Specifically, if ε < 1, the expenditure
share of services increases as pG/pS declines, and if c̄S > 0, the expenditure share of
services increases as income measured in units of services (i.e., (1 − f + fwH)/pS)
increases.














− wHHj − Lj.
Cost minimization plus the requirement that profits be zero in a competitive equilib-
rium for a firm with a constant returns to scale production function imply an equation











It follows that finding equilibrium prices can be reduced to a single dimension: if we
know the equilibrium value of wH then all of the remaining equilibrium prices can be
determined.
Equilibrium requires that all four markets clear: the two markets for output and
the two markets for labor. Here we derive an expression for the market-clearing






, the production function of sector j, and (3), we obtain a sector-specific









which, together with equilibrium in the goods market, yields the market-clearing
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f ĉGH (wH) + (1− f)ĉGL (wH)
AG
= f. (5)
Here we have used ĉji(wH) to denote the demand for output of sector j by a household
of skill level i when the high-skilled wage is wH and prices are given by the functions
p̂j(wH) defined in (3).
3.3 Structural Change and the Skill Premium
In this subsection we derive an analytic expression that summarizes how the sector-
specific skill-neutral component of technical change affects the skill premium. To do
this we focus on the special case in which preferences are homothetic (i.e., c̄S = 0)
and solve for a linear approximation of the model (i.e., equations (1), (2), (3), and




1− f + fwH
(1− f)ρ̃







where hj = Hj/f , eS = pS [(1− f)cSL + fcSH ] /(1− f + fwH), and ρ̃ is given by:
ρ̃ = ρ
(1− f + fwH)
(1− f)
[(
(1− θS)hS + (1− θG)hG
)
+ ε (θS − θG) (hS − eS)
]
,
where θj = wHHj/(pjYj).
Several results follow. First, proportional changes in the Aj have no impact on the
skill premium. (Recall that this derivation assumed homothetic preferences.) Second,
changes in the relative value of the Aj will have no effect on the skill premium if ε = 1.
(Notably, these results parallel standard results in the structural change literature re-
garding conditions under which technical change generates structural change.) Third,
assuming changes in the relative values of the Aj, and that ε 6= 1, there will be an
effect on the skill premium if and only if there is heterogeneity in skill intensity, i.e.,
if and only if the share of high-skill labor in services, hS, differs from the expenditure
share of services, eS. In particular, if dAGAG −
dAS
AS
> 0, and ε < 1, then the skill premium
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will increase if and only if the service sector is more skill intensive, i.e., hS > eS.
The effect of changes in the Aj on the skill premium are intimately related to





and the extent to which this change in relative prices affects
expenditure shares is dictated by the value of (1− ε).
For future purposes it is also of interest to derive an expression for the effect of a
change in the supply of skill on the skill premium. Our log linearization yields:











where ρ̃ is as defined above.
Equation (6) highlights the extent to which our two-sector model generalizes the
expression for the elasticity of the skill premium to a change in the supply of skills
relative to a one sector model. In a one sector model this elasticity is completely
determined by the elasticity of substitution in production and equals−1/ρ. In our two
sector model, the effective aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two types
of labor is potentially different due to the fact that one can substitute labor across
sectors. This can either amplify or dampen the effective elasticity of substitution
relative to a one sector model.25 If ε = 0, the two-sector elasticity is smaller than the
elasticity of substitution in production, ρ̃ < ρ, but for ε sufficiently high the reverse
holds, i.e., ρ̃ > ρ. We will use this expression in the next section when we calibrate
the value of ρ.
4 Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model of the previous section so as to be consistent with
the salient features of structural change, growth, and the changes in the skill premium
under the assumption that the driving forces are changes in technology (both skill-
biased and skill-neutral) and changes in the relative supply of skill.26 In particular,
25Intuitively, we see that ρ̃ = ρ if we ignore the general equilibrium impacts of the skill premium
on the price of sectoral output and of the changes in the supply of high-skill labor on the demand
for high-skill labor. That is, if we set ρ(θShS + θGhG) + ε(θS− θG)(hS− cS) = 0 and f(wH −1) = 0,
respectively. Of course, ρ̃ = ρ would also hold if these two general equilibrium effects happen to
perfectly offset each other.
26To the extent that factors such as changes in the minimum wage and unionization affect the skill
premium, our analysis will identify them as changes in skill-biased technical change. This was also
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we will use the above model to account for observed outcomes at two different points
in time, that we denote as 0 and T for the initial and terminal periods respectively.
Consistent with the existing literature on technological change and the skill premium,
we do not allow the parameter ρ to change over time. We also assume that preferences
are constant over time.
Calibrating the model in the initial and terminal period requires assigning values
for 14 parameters. Nine of these are technology parameters: four values of the αj
(two in each period), four values of the Aj (two in each period), and ρ. Three are
preference parameters: ε, aG and c̄S. Lastly we have the value of f at the initial and
terminal dates. The two initial values of the Aj represent a choice of units and the
initial and final values of f will be measured directly from the data. We will calibrate
the elasticity parameter ρ in accordance with existing estimates, appropriately filtered
through our model, as summarized by equation (6). (We describe this in more detail
at the end of the section.) This leaves nine parameters to be calibrated, six technology
parameters and three preference parameters.
Our calibration procedure will proceed in two steps. The first step describes how
we determine the six technology parameters independently of the three preference
parameters. Having determined the six technology parameters we then describe how
we determine the three preference parameters.
4.1 Calibrating Technology Parameters
In this section we show that the six technology parameters can be determined inde-
pendently of the three preference parameters if we target the following eight values
from the data: the initial and final values for factor shares in both sectors, the initial
and final value added shares for the two sectors, the initial and final value of the skill
premium, the change in the relative price of the two sectors, and the overall growth
rate of the economy.
To measure these targets in the data we rely on the World KLEMS data for the
U.S. for the years 1977 and 2005.27 This period is of particular interest, since 1977
the case for the analysis of Katz and Murphy (1992). Our estimate of the contribution of skill-biased
technical change should be understood as including the effects of these other factors.
27We use World KLEMS rather than EUKLEMS in this exercise to facilitate comparison with the
work by Katz and Murphy (1992). They base their analysis on the CPS, and it turns out that the
micro data underlying World KLEMS is much closer to the CPS data than the micro data underlying
EUKLEMS. The reason for the difference is that EUKLEMS makes adjustments so as to make their
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effectively marks a local minimum in the skill premium (see Acemoglu and Autor,
2011, for earlier data), after which it secularly increases.28
Many of the targets have obvious counterparts in the data and so require no
discussion. But two issues merit some discussion. The first concerns the fact that
because our model does not include investment, we implicitly assume that output
value-added shares reflect consumption value-added shares. We show in our sensitivity
analysis that adjusting the data as in Herrendorf et al. (2013) to compute consumption
value-added shares has virtually no impact on the targets used for calibration.
The second issue concerns the targets for the labor variables. As we discuss in
more detail later on, our procedure for decomposing compensation into price and
quantity is an important point of departure from the analysis in Katz and Murphy
(1992), so we next provide some detail on our method.
World KLEMS contains data on labor compensation per hour worked and average
hours worked by week by industry, educational attainment, class, gender, and age
groupings, as well as the number of employed individuals in each of these groupings.29
Consistent with our calculations in Section 2, we combine all workers with less than
college completion into our classification of low-skilled, and all workers with college
completion or more into our classification of high-skilled to calculate labor income
shares by skill at both the aggregate and sectoral level. We use the same sectoral
classification as in Section 2.
Setting targets for the skill premium and the relative supply of skilled workers
requires that we decompose labor payments into price and quantity components.
data match data from the BEA. We note however, that although the two datasets provide slightly
different answers for the shift-share calculations of Katz and Murphy, our model based results are
effectively unchanged if we instead use the EUKLEMS data to provide all of our calibration targets.
We continue to use EUKLEMS for cross-country comparisons because this cannot be done in World
KLEMS.
28We choose 2005 as our terminal date because this is the last period available consistently across
datasets.
29Until 1992 educational attainment is based on years of schooling and classified into six cate-
gories “less than high school”, “some high school”, “high school graduates”, “some college”, “college
graduates”, and “more than college graduates”. After 1992, this classification changes to highest level
achieved, being the categories “8th grade or less”, “grades 9-12 no diploma”, “high school graduates”,
“some college no degree, associate degree”, “BA,BS”, and “more than BA”. Whenever we need to
compute consistent time series using these categories, we perform the adjustment suggested in Jaeger
(1997).
There are two classes of workers (employees and self employed) and eight age groups (14-15, 16-
17, 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over). Weekly hours are normalized so that weeks
worked per year total 52.
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If all workers within each skill type were identical then we could simply use total
hours as our measure of quantity, but given the large differences in hourly wage rates
among subgroups in each skill type this seems ill-advised. Instead, we assume that
each subgroup within a skill type offers a different amount of efficiency units per
hour of work.30 We normalize efficiency units within each skill type by assuming
one hour supplied by a high school-educated prime-aged (i.e., aged 35-44) male is
equal to one efficiency unit of low-skill labor and that one hour supplied by a college-
educated prime-aged (i.e., aged 35-44) male is equal to one efficiency unit of high-skill
labor.31 With this choice of units, the skill premium is defined as the ratio of college-
educated to high school-educated prime-aged (i.e., aged 35-44) male wages. This
premium rises from 1.33 in 1977 to 1.88 in 2005.32 Note that our implicit assumption
is that differences in wages between different demographic groups within a given skill
category reflect differences in efficiency units. This interpretation is consistent with
standard practice in the literature on heterogeneous agent models.
We infer f using the identity that the ratio of labor compensation equals the
product of the skill premium and the relative quantity of high- to low-skill labor (f
and 1 − f , respectively).33 This procedure implies that high-skill labor was 21% of
total labor supply in 1977 and rose to 32% in 2005.
Table 2 summarizes the values that will be used to calibrate the technology pa-
rameters.
Table 2
Values Used to Calibrate Technology Parameters
f0 fT wH0 wHT %∆
pS
pG





0.21 0.32 1.33 1.88 45.6 80.8 0.18 0.36 0.50 0.65 0.25 0.39
30The Online Appendix contains more details on our procedure.
31While one could obviously normalize units by choosing other reference groups, this group seems
most natural since its uniformly high rate of participation over time minimizes issues associated with
selection.
32Comparing earnings of full time workers using CPS data, Figure 1 in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) indicates values of 1.48 and 1.89 for 1977 and 2005 respectively. Our measure indicates a
fourteen percentage point greater increase. This difference basically reflects the fact that Acemoglu
and Autor compute a fixed-weight, composition-adjusted average wage for high school and college
graduates of different experience, race, and gender groups. If we redo their analysis with CPS data
but using only male workers aged 35-44, we find a 52 percentage point increase in the skill premium,
consistent with our measured increase using World KLEMS data.
33Equivalently, one could compute efficiency units of each skill type by using relative wages within
each skill group to infer efficiency units and directly aggregating efficiency units.
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We now describe the details of how these values are used to determine the values
of the six technology parameters. We begin with the determination of the αjt. Given
a value for ρ, the four values of the αjt are pinned down by sectoral factor income
shares and the skill premium, wHt. To see this, from equations (3) and (4) note that






αρjt + (1− αjt)ρw
ρ−1
Ht














Next we determine the values of the Ajt’s. As noted previously, the two values
in period 0 basically reflect a choice of units and so can be normalized. We will
normalize AS0 to equal one, and given the calibrated values for the αj0 and the value
of wH0, we choose AG0 so as to imply pG0/pS0 = 1. A convenient implication of this
normalization is that pGT/pST is not only the level of relative price in period T but
is also the change in the relative price between periods 0 and T .34
As is well known in the literature, with identical Cobb-Douglas sectoral technolo-
gies, relative sectoral prices are simply the inverse of relative sectoral TFPs, so the
change in relative prices would therefore determine the values of the two AjT ’s up to
a scale factor.35 This precise result does not apply to our setting because of sectoral
heterogeneity in the αjt’s. Nonetheless, there is still a close connection between rel-
ative sectoral prices and relative values of the Ajt. In particular, using equation (3)











34While our main results will only use information from the initial and final periods, we note that
the procedure described here can be used to uncover the entire sequence of technology parameters
from period 0 to period T .
35This same relation holds more generally, and in particular would also apply if the sectoral
production functions are CES with identical parameters.
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The scale factor influences the overall growth rate of the economy between periods
0 and T , so we choose this scale factor to target the aggregate growth rate of output
per worker. Note that to compute aggregate output at a point in time (and thus also
the growth rate in aggregate output) it is necessary to know the sectoral distribution
of output. The relations imposed thus far guarantee that maximum profits will be zero
in each sector, but they do not determine the scale of operation. Intuitively, the split
of activity across sectors at given prices will be determined by the relative demands
of households for the two outputs. Below we describe how preference parameters are
chosen to match the sectoral distribution of value added at both the initial and final
date. At this stage we simply assume this split is the same as in the data.
To this point we have identified all of the technology parameters conditional on a
value of ρ. We postpone a detailed discussion of the calibration of ρ until the end of
this section, but note here that for our benchmark analysis we set ρ = 1.53 and that
filtered through equation (6), our value implies an effective aggregate elasticity very
close to the one used by Katz and Murphy (1992). Table 3 presents the benchmark
calibrated values for the technology parameters.
Table 3
Calibrated Technology Parameters (ρ = 1.53)
αG0 αS0 αGT αST AST /AS0 AGT /AG0
0.29 0.53 0.46 0.65 1.45 2.35
We note three features from this table. First, and not surprising given the way
in which we grouped industries into the two sectors, the weight on low-skill labor is
greater in the goods sector than in the service sector at both dates. Second and more
interesting is that in both sectors technological change has an important component
that is skill-biased. In fact, the level rise in α is greater for the goods sector than the
service sector (0.17 versus 0.12). And third, neutral technological progress is much
greater in the goods sector than in the service sector. The average annual growth
rate of AGt is 2.99%, while the average annual growth rate of ASt is only 1.29% per
year.
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4.2 Calibrating Preference Parameters
We now turn to the issue of determining values for the three preference parameters:
aG, c̄S and ε. While the previous subsection showed that technological change can be
inferred without specifying any of the preference parameters, we cannot evaluate some
of the counterfactual exercises of interest without knowing how relative demands for
the sectoral outputs are affected by changes in prices.
The calibration of the AjT used information about sectoral expenditure shares
without guaranteeing that observed expenditure shares were consistent with house-
hold demands given prices. Requiring that the aggregate expenditure share for goods
and services are consistent with the observed values in the data for the initial and
terminal date provides two restrictions on the three preference parameters. Loosely
speaking, given a value for aG, requiring the model to match the initial and final
value-added shares requires that the model match the overall amount of structural
change but does not determine the relative contribution of income effects and relative
price effects. These are in turn dictated by the values of c̄S and ε. Knowledge about
one of these parameters would allow us to infer the other.
Earlier in this paper we presented evidence on the effect of income on the relative
expenditure share. We also emphasized that estimates based on the CEX should
be treated with caution given they do not include government expenditure and that
this is an important component of overall spending on skill-intensive sectors such as
health and education.
Alternatively, the empirical literature has provided estimates of ε that correspond
to the categories of “true” goods and “true” services, but not for our definitions of the
two sectors that are based purely on skill intensity. However, given that our goods
sector does contain all of the industries that produce goods, while our service sector
does consist entirely of service sector industries, information about the elasticity of
substitution between “true” goods and “true” services is plausibly informative about
the empirically plausible range of values for ε in our model. Recalling that the objects
in our utility function reflect the value added components of sectoral output, the
relevant estimates in the literature would include Herrendorf et al. (2013), Buera and
Kaboski (2009), and Swiecki (2017). All of these studies suggest very low degrees of
substitutability.36 Based on these studies we think a reasonable range of values for ε
36Comin et al. (2015) redo the exercise in Herrendorf et al. (2013) for a more general class of
preferences and find an elasticity of substitution that is somewhat higher, around 0.50, which is our
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is 0 to 0.50.
In light of the above partial information about income and substitution effects,
we proceed as follows. We consider three values of ε from the above range: 0.01,
0.10, and 0.50. For each of these values for ε, we use equation (2) to determine values
for aG and c̄S by requiring the model to match the initial and final sectoral value
added shares. Given these values we compute the implied income elasticity of the
relative expenditure share for the skill-intensive sector by comparing the consumption
expenditure shares and incomes of low- and high-skill workers in our model. When
ε = 0.10, the implied income elasticity for the skill-intensive expenditure share is
0.085, which is close to the value in column 4 of Table 1. We choose this as our
benchmark specification.
Our main results turn out to be quite insensitive to the relative importance of in-
come and substitution effects in generating the observed amount of structural change.
To allow us to explore this sensitivity even more fully we will also consider the case
of ε = 1.00, which implies that structural change is entirely caused by income effects,
since relative prices have no impact on expenditure shares when ε = 1.00 if prefer-





Benchmark 0.10 0.99 0.11
Low ε 0.01 1.00 0.09
Intermediate ε 0.50 0.49 0.24
High ε 1.00 0.26 0.87
The qualitative patterns in this table are intuitive. Recall that the calibration
procedure implies that in each specification the changes in income, relative prices
and aggregate expenditure shares are the same. Consider the changes as we move
from ε = 0.10 to ε = 0.50. This increases the elasticity of substitution between the
two goods, implying a smaller response in relative expenditure shares. To compensate
for this smaller effect, the impact of income changes on relative expenditure shares
must increase, implying a higher value for c̄S. The higher value for c̄S will in turn
intermediate case.
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lead to a lower expenditure share on services in the initial period, thereby requiring
a lower weight, aG, on the consumption of goods.
Consistent with the literature that considers “true” goods and “true” services, we
also find that some income effects are needed to rationalize the data, as c̄S remains
positive even when ε = 0.01, which is effectively the case of Leontief preferences and
serves to maximize the role of relative price effects.37
4.3 Calibrating ρ
We are now in a position to describe our procedure for calibrating the value of ρ. Our
procedure follows closely the one originally adopted by Katz and Murphy (1992), and






























Their strategy was to assume that technical change proceeded at a constant rate












They concluded that ρ = 1.41.
We follow this same strategy using our data and time period, but note two dif-
ferences in implementation. First, as noted earlier, we use a different procedure to
measure efficiency units of labor. Second, recalling equation (6), the above regression
will identify the value of ρ̃, which we then use to infer the value of ρ.38 Note that the
mapping from ρ̃ to ρ depends on the preference parameter ε, so that our procedure
implies a different value of ρ for each profile of preference parameters.
37To have better sense of magnitudes, in the benchmark case the value of the non-homotheticity
parameter relative to GDP pS c̄S/(1− fH + fHwH) = 0.24 and 0.17 in the initial and final periods,
respectively.
38For this step we solve for the implied value of ρ at the initial period in our sample. The implied
value of ρ is roughly the same if we take the final period instead.
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Despite the difference in time periods and measurement of labor, our estimated
value of a3 in equation (8) is very close to that obtained by Katz and Murphy (1992);
they obtained a value of −0.709 while we obtain −0.708. For our benchmark speci-
fication with ε = 0.10 the implied value of ρ is 1.53, which is also quite close to the
value of 1.41 used by Katz and Murphy (1992). For ε in the range of 0 to 0.50, the
variation in ρ is not that large, varying from 1.42 to 1.55. When ε = 1.0 the change
is more substantial, as the implied value of ρ is 1.18 for this case.
5 Results
The procedure described in the previous section implies that our calibrated model
will perfectly account for the observed change in the skill premium between 1977 and
2005. In this section we use the calibrated model to decompose changes in the skill
premium into parts due to the exogenous driving forces in the model. Our primary
objective is to decompose the effect of technical change on the skill premium into a
piece due to the skill-biased component of technological change and a second piece
due to the sector-specific skill-neutral component of technological change.
5.1 Sources of Change in the Skill Premium
We begin by decomposing the change in the skill premium between 1977 and 2005
into three pieces. The first piece represents the effect of changes in the supply of skill
(i.e., changes in f). Consistent with equation (6), an increase in the supply of skill
holding technology constant will lead to a decline in the skill premium. The value of
f increases from 0.21 in 1977 to 0.32 in 2005. In our benchmark specification (i.e.,
ε = 0.10) this increase in f holding all else constant would have led to a reduction of
wH from 1.33 to 0.87.39
In reality (and in our calibrated model) the skill premium increased from 1.33 in
1977 to 1.88 in 2005. As just noted, if the only change had been a change in the
supply of skill, then wH would have decreased to 0.87 in 2005. From this we conclude
that technical change generated an increase in the demand for skill that collectively
increased the skill premium from 0.87 to 1.88, an increase of 1.01. Our next goal is
39Because we calibrate ρ so as to hold the effective local elasticity of substitution constant as ε
varies, this change is very nearly identical for all of our profiles for preference parameters.
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to decompose this change of 1.01 into one part due to the skill-biased component of
technical change (i.e., changes in the αj) and one part due to the sector-specific skill-
neutral change component of technical change (i.e., changes in the Aj). In the next
subsection we show that the changes in the Aj are intimately related to structural
change.
A natural way to evaluate each of these effects is to start from the economy with
initial technology settings and f = fT , which would imply wH = 0.87, and evaluate
the effect on wH of moving to final values for either the αj or the Aj. If the model
were linear, these two effects would necessarily add up to the total effect of changes
in technology. However, it turns out that there is a relatively small positive residual
that reflects interactions between the two different changes in technology. Table 5
presents the results of this exercise.
Table 5
Effect of Technological Change on the Skill Premium
US, 1977-2005
ε = 0.01 ε = 0.10 ε = 0.50 ε = 1.00
(i) Total ∆wH due to Technology 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02
(ii) ∆wH due purely to the Aj 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15
(iii) ∆wH due purely to the αj 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76
(iv) ∆wH due to interaction 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
(v) % Contribution of the Aj 18.1− 23.8 18.0− 24.0 17.2− 24.5 15.3− 24.4
The first row of Table 5 presents the total increase in the skill premium due to
all sources of technical change and represents the difference between the actual skill
premium in 2005 and our model implied counterfactual for what the skill premium
would have been if the only change had been the supply of skill. As noted earlier,
this is effectively the same for all of the specifications.
The next three rows in Table 5 present the size of the change due purely to changes
in the Aj, due purely to changes in the αj, and the interaction term. The final row
shows the range for the percent contributions of the change in the Aj as we vary the
fraction of the interaction term allocated to changes in Aj from zero to one.
Focusing on the benchmark calibration (ε = 0.10) case for now, the final row of
Table 5 shows that the change in the Aj account for between 18 and 24 percent of
the overall change in the skill premium due to technological change. Put somewhat
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differently, according to our calibrated model, if skill-biased technical change had been
the only force affecting the relative demand for skill then the skill premium would
have increased by only 31−37 percentage points over the period 1977 to 2005 instead
of increasing by 55 percentage points.
While our results imply that the skill-biased component of technical change is the
dominant source of changes in the skill premium, some care should be exercised in
interpreting this. As we noted earlier, the literature has noted that changes due to
factors such as minimum wages, unionization and trade will be included as reflecting
skill-biased technical change. Some estimates claim that as much as half of measured
skill-biased technical change might be due to these other factors. (See, for example,
DiNardo et al (1996).) With this in mind, our results suggest a much less dominant
role for skill-biased technical change.
Looking at the other columns in Table 5 we see that the relative importance of
the change in the Aj is fairly similar across the specifications, with the overall range
being 15.3 − 24.5 percent. Although the pure effect of the Aj is a bit smaller when
ε = 1.00, the interaction term is significantly larger. We conclude that our estimate of
the importance of changes in the Aj for changes in the skill premium is robust to the
relative importance of income and substitution effects in generating structural change;
that is, conditional on our model being calibrated so as to generate the amount of
structural change that we see in the data, it is relatively unimportant to determine
the mix of income and substitution effects that leads to this change. This is reassuring
given the lack of definitive values for ε and c̄S.
5.2 Sources of Structural Change
In the introduction we stressed the fact that aggregate production function analyses
abstract from compositional changes, and that a key objective of our analysis was to
assess the quantitative importance of the compositional changes that are associated
with the process of structural transformation during development. The previous
calculations decomposed the overall changes in the skill premium due to technology
into parts due to the αj and the Aj. In order to make the connection between this
decomposition and compositional changes it is necessary to examine the connection
between structural change and the components of technical change.
To do this we start by assessing the amount of structural change that would have
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occurred had there not been any change in the Aj. Results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Value Added Share of the Skill-Intensive Sector
US, 1977-2005
ε = 0.01 ε = 0.10 ε = 0.50 ε = 1.00
Model 1977 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Model 2005 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Model 2005 with fixed Aj 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24
The first two rows of the table remind us that the skill-intensive sector grew
significantly between 1977 and 2005, increasing its share of value added from 25
percent to 39 percent. Recall that our calibrated model perfectly replicates the change
in the data. The third row shows what would have happened if there had not been
any changes in the Aj. Significantly, this would have led to a decline in the value-
added share for the skill-intensive sector. Given that (more than) all of the observed
structural change is due to changes in the Aj, we think it is appropriate to identify
the channel through which the Aj affect the skill premium as reflecting compositional
change.
It is significant that the pure effect of the change in the Aj on the value added
share of the skill-intensive sector is actually greater than the overall observed change:
0.18 versus 0.14. That is, the amount of structural change generated by the changes
in the Aj is more than twenty percent larger than the amount of structural change
observed in the data. It follows that the amount of observed structural change in
the data is not a good estimate of the amount of structural change induced by the
change in the Aj. The significance of this will be highlighted in the next section when
we contrast our model-based findings with those found by Katz and Murphy (1992)
using shift-share methods.
The third row of Table 6 reported the combined effect of the changes in f and
the αj on the value-added share of the skill-intensive sector. It is also of interest to
assess the role of each of these changes separately. It turns out that the changes in
the αj and f contribute equally to this modest decline. If we change f from its 1977
value to its 2005 value but holding technology constant, we see a decline in the value
added share of the skill-intensive sector to 0.23. The reason for this decrease is that
the increase in the supply of skill lowers the skill premium, thereby reducing income
and lowering the relative price of the skill-intensive sector which is more intensive in
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the use of skilled labor. Both of these effects serve to shift expenditure away from
the skill-intensive sector. It is interesting to note that an increase in the supply of
high-skill labor does not by itself lead to an expansion of the sector that is more
intensive in its use of high-skill labor.
The changes in the αj also produce a modest decline in the value-added share
of the skill-intensive sector. This reflects the net effect of several opposing effects.
Because this sector uses high-skill labor more intensively, a uniform increase in α
would have a larger productivity effect on it, thereby lowering its relative price and
shifting expenditure to the goods sector. But, as noted earlier, the increase in αG
is somewhat larger than the increase in αS. The increase in the αj also lead to an
increase in the skill premium, which also tends to increase the relative price of the
skill-intensive sector.
6 Comparison With the Literature
In the previous section we argued that changes in the composition of demand driven
by technical change have played a significant role in the overall increase in the demand
for skill. This finding stands in sharp contrast to previous findings in the literature,
specifically those in Katz and Murphy (1992) and Leonardi (2015). In this section,
we examine the reasons behind these different conclusions.
6.1 Comparison With Katz and Murphy (1992)
We begin by examining how our results compare with those of Katz and Murphy
(1992) (hereafter KM). They employ a shift-share method to assess the contribution
of changes in sectoral composition to the overall increase in the demand for skill.
Specifically, their “Between Industry Demand Shift” for group k measured relative to



















where Ek is group k’s employment measured in efficiency units and φj,k = (Ej,k/Ej)
is group k’s share of total employment in efficiency units in sector j in the base year.
The implied change in the relative demand for skill associated with changes in the
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sectoral distribution of employment can in turn be used to infer the implied change in
the skill premium by using their estimate of the elasticity of substitution between low
and high-skilled labor. They conclude that changes in sectoral composition accounted
for only 10.6% of the increase in the skill premium between 1979 and 1987.
There are many differences in details between their study and ours: the data
sources are different (CPS vs World KLEMS), the measure of payments to workers
are different (weekly earnings for full time workers versus compensation per hour),
the time periods are different (1963-1987 vs 1977-2005), and the level of aggregation
is different (50 sectors vs 2 sectors). In the appendix we report a series of detailed
calculations to show that none of these differences is of first-order significance in
explaining the very different results. In particular, when we redo the analysis of KM
using our data, our time period, and our level of aggregation, we find that changes
in sectoral composition account for only 10.3% of the increase in the skill premium.
This result is shown in row (i) of Table 7.
A less apparent difference is that our analysis targeted changes in sectoral compo-
sition based on changes in value added shares, whereas the KM procedure measures
changes in sectoral composition based on labor compensation shares. This is signifi-
cant because the change in sectoral compensation shares is greater than the change
in sectoral value-added shares.40
To make the KM numbers directly comparable to ours we redo the KM analysis
but using changes in value-added shares. This turns out to have a significant quan-
titative impact. In particular, row (ii) of Table 7 shows that redoing the KM shift
share calculation with value-added shares as sectoral weights reduces their estimated
contribution of compositional changes by almost five percentage points, to 5.7%. It
is this value that should be compared with our estimated range of 18− 24%.41
In what follows we show that there are two key differences that account for the
fact that our estimate is between 2.5 and 3 times larger than theirs. The first key
40We noted this feature of the data in Section 2. For the US, the value added share of the high-skill
sector increased from 0.25 to 0.39 between 1977 and 2005 whereas the compensation share of the
high-skill sector increased from 0.27 to 0.47.
41Alternatively, we could have redone our benchmark calibration exercise to target the change in
compensation shares rather than the change in value added shares. If we do this we find a range of
26.4− 35.9% for the contribution of changes in the Aj to the change in the skill premium. In both
cases our model based approach implies an effect that is between 2.5 and 3 times larger than the
corresponding estimate based on the KM shift share calculation. Details of this alternative exercise
are included in the Online Appendix.
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difference is the method for measuring efficiency units of labor. The second key
difference is that our results rely on model based simulation rather than shift share
calculations. We discuss each in turn.
Table 7
Comparison With Katz-Murphy (1992)
Years Data Efficiency Units #Sectors Method Weights Contribution
(i) 1977-05 WK KM 2 Shift-Share Wages 10.3%
(ii) 1977-05 WK KM 2 Shift-share VA 5.7%
(iii) 1977-05 WK BKRV 2 Shift-share VA 12.9%
(iv) 1977-05 WK BKRV 2 Model-based VA 18.0− 24.0%
As noted earlier, within each skill category, we use relative compensation to mea-
sure relative efficiency units supplied by individuals and supplied to sectors. Im-
portantly, we allow for efficiency units to vary across workers within a given educa-
tion/age/gender cell, since this is how we account for compensation differences within
a given cell. In contrast, KM assume that all workers within a given cell supply the
same number of efficiency units and measure relative quantities of skilled and less
skilled labor without using individual- or sector-specific data on compensation.42 As
shown by Row (iii) of Table 7, this turns out to have very significant implications, in-
creasing the estimate based on the KM shift share methodology from 5.7% to 12.9%.43
We now turn to the second key difference: our use of a model-based procedure.
Row (iv) of Table 7 shows the significance of moving from KM’s shift-share analysis
to our fully solved general equilibrium evaluation of exogenous shifts in technology
parameters. KM acknowledge that their method might underestimate the underlying
contribution of demand shifts if other factors, e.g., the rise of the skill premium due
to skill-biased technical change, served to dampen the reallocation to skill-intensive
sectors.44 But they are unable to quantify the extent to which they underestimate
the effect. Our model-based method enables us to actually quantify this bias.
42The Online Appendix provides a framework for thinking about the issue of measuring labor
services and details the differences between our procedure and that of Katz and Murphy (1992).
43Because our calibrated model replicates all of the values in the data that go into this calculation
it follows that this value also reflects what the KM procedure would infer from our model generated
data.
44Bound and Johnson adjust for the increase in the relative supply of high-skilled labor without
accounting for the fact that the relative wage nevertheless rose. This appears to account for their
much lower estimate than KM.
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Importantly, because we derive endogenous changes in composition as the result of
exogenous changes in model primitives, we can map changes in primitives to changes
in composition and changes in the skill premium, rather than trying to map changes
in composition into changes in the skill premium. To understand the reason that this
matters, note that the shift-share calculation uses observed changes in composition
to evaluate the effect of compositional changes. But as we showed at the end of the
previous section, the change in composition that is associated with changes in the Aj
was significantly larger than the observed change in composition. This implies that
the shift share calculation will necessarily underestimate the effect of the change in
the Aj. As a final remark, we note that our analysis uses a global solution of the
model, whereas shift share calculations are inherently based on local approximation.
In summary, while there are many small variations, there are two important fac-
tors that explain why we find a substantially larger role for skill-biased structural
change in accounting for increases in the skill premium relative to what the earlier
literature attributed to industrial composition. The first is that we use wage data
to control for unobservable differences among workers within a cell. This implies a
larger increase in the demand for efficiency units by the skill intensive sector, thereby
increasing the potential impact of compositional changes on the relative demand for
skill. The second is that our structural approach allows us to precisely disentangle
the role of different driving forces by solving an explicit model-based, globally-solved
counterfactual associated with changes in exogenous technology parameters. Each of
these factors plays a key role. Measurement differences alone account for a difference
of around 7 percentage points, and the use of a model based procedure implies a
difference of between 5 and 11 percentage points.
6.2 Comparison With Leonardi (2015)
Leonardi (2015) also asks if changes in composition might be an important mech-
anism through which some changes in economic primitives lead to changes in the
skill premium. Differently than us, he finds that these effects are relatively small.
In particular, his exercise finds that the channel of compositional shifts explains ap-
proximately 6.5% of the relative demand shift in the US between 1984 and 2002 (see
Table 6 in Leonardi, 2015). In this section we discuss the reasons for the apparently
different findings and show that there is no inconsistency.
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As a first step it is important to summarize the calculations in Leonardi (2015).
He specifies a two-sector model very similar to ours. One difference is that in his
model, high-skill workers have a relatively higher expenditure share for the output
of the skill-intensive sector for two reasons. First, as in our framework, preferences
are non-homothetic and the income elasticity for this sector’s output is greater than
one. Second, he also allows for preferences to differ across low and high-skill workers,
and in particular, allows high-skill workers to place greater value on the output of the
skill-intensive sector. His calculations are based on a log linear approximation of the
demand system generated by this model.
His result comes from the following calculations. First, he calculates the coun-
terfactual percentage change in the skill premium induced by a pure increase in the
relative supply of skilled labor. Second, he considers an alternative version of the
model in which preferences of high and low-skill workers are identical and homo-
thetic, and then repeats the previous calculation, i.e., calculates the counterfactual
percentage change in the skill premium that would have occurred from a pure increase
in the relative supply of skilled workers. His estimate for the effect of demand shifts
is calculated by taking the difference in the two percentage changes just calculated.
Comparing this to the total percentage change in the skill premium he arrives at 6.5%
for the contribution of demand shifts to changes in the skill premium.
Both our paper and Leonardi (2015) present model based calculations about the
effect of changes in model primitives on the skill premium that manifest themselves
via changes in sector composition. Moreover, the two analyses employ very similar
models, with the lone difference being that Leonardi (2015) allows high-skilled work-
ers to have different preferences. But importantly, the two papers focus on different
changes in fundamentals. Whereas Leonardi’s calculation isolates compositional ef-
fects that result from a change in the relative supply of skills, we isolate compositional
effects that result from the sector-specific skill-neutral component of technical change.
Because the two exercises isolate the effects of different shocks, the different results
do not reflect any inconsistency.
To pursue this further we can use our model to carry out the same calculation as
Leonardi. The answer that we obtain varies depending upon the profile of preference
parameters that we use, and ranges from 0.3% to 5.6%, with the 5.6% value coming
from the extreme case in which ε = 1.00 and income effects are maximized. Keeping
in mind that the two analyses differ in terms of various details (slight differences in
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each of time period considered, model specification and calibration procedure), we
view this result as confirming that there is no inconsistency across the two studies.
We conclude that the differing conclusions are due to the fact that the two papers
document the effects of different changes in fundamentals. Indeed, Leonardi’s and
our exercises are complementary in the sense that the contribution obtained by the
counterfactual proposed by Leonardi must be added to our numbers to obtain the
total effect that is mediated via sectoral composition.
7 Sensitivity Exercises
In this section we report on four sensitivity exercises. In the first subsection we
discuss the issue that our model does not contain investment and how controlling
for this would affect our results. In the second subsection we discuss how allowing
for trade would affect our findings. In the third section we discuss the implications
of the possibility that observed changes in relative prices are biased upward due to
mismeasured output. And in the fourth section we consider how our results are
affected by allowing for a simple extension with endogenous skill supply.
7.1 Consumption Value Added vs Investment Value Added
Our analysis emphasizes the consequences of the systematic changes in the compo-
sition of output that accompany development for the overall demand for skill. Our
model abstracts from investment and so implicitly focuses on systematic changes in
the composition of consumption that accompany development. This raises the issue
of whether the systematic changes in consumption value-added shares mimic the sys-
tematic changes in output value-added shares. Here we address this question and
show that the two are very similar.
Herrendorf et al. (2013) carried out a similar exercise but for the traditional sec-
toral classification of agriculture, goods and services. They describe the procedure in
detail in the online appendix to their paper. We follow their methodology but using
our sectoral categories and so refer the reader to their paper for details.
Implementing the procedure in Herrendorf et al. (2013) uses the Historical I-O
Tables produced by the BEA. Our analysis focuses on the period 1977-2005, and
within this time period the I-O Tables are available at five year intervals from 1977
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to 1997 and annually thereafter.
Before presenting the results we note two points. First, World KLEMS uses
NAICS codes to define sectors, whereas the BEA uses SIC codes, so the sectoral
comparisons are not perfectly matched. Second, the BEA and World KLEMS data
sets use somewhat different measurement methodologies and as a result the levels of
some variables will vary across the two. We have used the World KLEMS data for our
output measures in order to have consistency with the labor measures that we use.
But in view of these two issues, we are most interested in comparing the implications
for the change in the value-added share of the skill-intensive sector.
When we carry out this exercise we find that the consumption value-added share
for the skill-intensive service sector increases from 21% in 1977 to 36% in 2005. Our
calibration exercise used output value-added shares fromWorld KLEMS, and based on
this data, we found that the output value added share of our service sector increased
from 25% in 1977 to 39% in 2005.
While there are level differences between the two measurements, the key point for
our purposes is that the increase in the share of the skill-intensive services sector is
virtually identical between the two: 13.8% for the output value added share in our
calibration exercise, versus 15.4% for the consumption value added share using the
data from the BEA and the method of Herrendorf et al. (2013). We conclude that
purging the data of investment is not an important concern.45
This finding is perhaps not too surprising given the results in Herrendorf et al.
(2020). They show that similar structural change has happened within both the
consumption sector and the investment sector. In view of this it is not that surprising
that the amount of structural change in consumption is similar to the amount of
structural change found in total output.
7.2 Allowing for Trade
Our benchmark analysis considers a closed economy and so abstracted from changes
in trade as a potential driving force. As we noted earlier, to the extent that much of
trade takes place within the goods producing sector, it is possible that some of the
skill-biased technological change that we infer reflects changes in composition within
45In fact, if we redo our calibration exercise using the consumption valued added shares from this
calculation instead of the output value added shares that we originally used we find modestly larger
effects. We now find that the contribution of the Aj is in the range of 19-26%.
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our low-skill intensive sector due to changes in specialization associated with trade.
This alone would not affect our estimate of the contribution of the Aj to the overall
change in the skill premium, though by diminishing the contribution of skill-biased
technical change it would increase their relative importance.
More generally, lower trade costs can lead to greater specialization and hence
higher productivity, so part of the productivity increases that we measure may result
from trade. Our procedure aims to assess the contribution of productivity increases
to the skill premium, but does not seek to understand the underlying source of the
productivity increase. While we think it is of interest to assess the role of trade as
a source of productivity growth, this issue is separate from the one we address. We
refer the reader to the paper by Cravino and Sotelo (2019) for an analysis of the
effects of lower trade costs on the skill premium in a framework similar to ours.
But not all trade takes place within the goods sector and the share of trade
accounted for by trade in services is increasing over time. It is therefore possible that
changes in trade patterns may also contribute to changes in the relative size of the
skill-intensive sector. In this subsection we carry out a simple exercise to assess the
potential magnitude of this effect. In particular, we will take sectoral net trade flows
as given and solve for the equilibrium of our model given these flows.
Net sectoral trade flows create a wedge between production and consumption in
each sector. If net exports from the skill-intensive sector are increasing over time, this
would imply a decrease in consumption of the skill-intensive sector output holding
labor allocations constant. Hence, this would create an incentive to increase the share
of labor allocated to the skill-intensive sector in order to increase consumption from
that sector. Similarly, if the imports of goods are increasing over time, then this would
increase the relative consumption of low-skill intensive goods holding labor allocations
fixed, and again create an incentive to reallocate labor to the skill-intensive sector. It
follows that part of the movement of resources to the skill-intensive sector could be
the result of changes in trade and not necessarily technology.
To estimate net trade flows for our two sector breakdown we do the following.
From the Balance of Payments Accounts we obtain data on net trade flows for the
“true” goods sector and the “true” services sector in the US economy for the full
sample, 1977-2005. Over these years, the US ran a trade deficit in trade in “true”
goods, and the deficit increased from around 1.4 percent of GDP to around 6 percent
of GDP. Over the same time period the US ran a small trade surplus in “true” services,
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increasing from around 0.2 percent of GDP to around 0.5 percent of GDP. This trade
surplus in services is to first approximation a trade surplus in skill-intensive services,
as there is a small and relatively constant trade deficit in low-skill services, so that
the overall change in the trade deficit in what we label the low-skill intensive sector
(consisting of both goods and low-skill services) is to first approximation the same as
the trade deficit coming purely from goods.46 To evaluate these assumptions we can
use disaggregated trade flows in services that are available from the BEA for a subset
(1999-2005) of our simulation years. Splitting these flows into low- and high-skill
intensive services components using our previous definitions and aggregate net trade
flows to correspond to our model defined sectors, we show that our crude assumption,
needed for the longer period, is a very good approximation over these years.
Taking net sectoral trade flows as given we implement the same calibration pro-
cedure as before and carry out the same counterfactuals to decompose the effects of
technology. Intuitively, if net exports of the skill-intensive service sector are increas-
ing over time, our calibration procedure would imply a lower value of c̄s, since the
needed income effect from changes in technology would be reduced. Accordingly, the
implied amount of skill-biased structural change would also be reduced.
The key message that results is that incorporating changes in trade has a relatively
small effect on our results. In the interest of space we only report results for the
benchmark case of ε = .10. Whereas our earlier results implied that changes in
the Ajt’s accounted for between 18 and 24 percent of the overall change in the skill
premium due to technical change, we now find that the range is between 16 and 21
percent. While the changing net sectoral trade balance does account for some of the
movement of resources into the skill-intensive service sector, we find this effect to be
relatively small.
7.3 Mismeasurement of Relative Price Changes
Here we consider the extent to which mismeasurement of relative prices might influ-
ence our results. Our quantitative analysis utilized information about changes in the
relative price of the skill-intensive sector. Between 1977 and 2005 this relative price
increased by more than forty-five percent. One possible concern is that price inflation
46Our net export figure for the goods sector is based on total value and is likely an overestimate
of the deficit measured in terms of value added. For this reason we think our estimates for the effect
of trade are likely an upper bound.
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in the skill-intensive sector might be upward biased because of the failure to properly
account for quality improvements.
Here we report the results of a simple exercise to assess the extent to which our
conclusions are affected by this possibility. In particular, consider the case in which
the true increase in the relative price of the skill-intensive sector was only half as much
as indicated by the official data. This means that real value added in this sector
increased by roughly 30% more than indicated by the official data, and aggregate
GDP grew by roughly 7 additional percentage points. Note that this adjustment has
no impact on the increase in the value added share of the skill-intensive sector.
We set ρ = 1.53 and ε = 0.10 and carry out the same calibration procedure as
previously. Not surprisingly, given that we are holding ε fixed and decreasing the role
of relative price changes, the calibration procedure yields a larger value for c̄S, indi-
cating a larger role for nonhomotheticities. However, we find that the contribution of
the skill-neutral component of technical change is virtually identical to what we found
in our benchmark calculation. So while mismeasurement of relative price changes has
implications for relative magnitudes of preference parameters, it has virtually no ef-
fect on our assessment of the role of demand factors. This follows naturally with the
result that the different channels are less relevant to our quantitative impact as the
overall amount of structural change.
7.4 Endogenizing the Supply of Skills
In the benchmark analysis we take the observed changes in the supply of skilled labor
as an independent exogenous driving force. But if changes in the relative supply of
skill are driven by changes in the skill premium, this specification may be inappropri-
ate. Here we consider a simple extension in which changes in supply are completely
due to changes in the skill premium to assess how this affects our results.
In particular, we assume a simple reduced form relationship between the supply of
skill and the skill premium, fh = f̄hwζH . This simple relationship can be interpreted as
a steady state supply function. We calibrate the parameters f̄h = 0.15 and ζ = 1.25
so that we match the supply of skills in 1977 and 2005, when using the benchmark
values for the preference and technology elasticities ε = 0.1 and ρ = 1.53, respectively.
We obtain a similar contribution for the changes in the Ajt’s in the range of 21−23%.
This result is perhaps not surprising. If changes in the supply of skill are com-
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pletely driven by changes in the skill premium then changes in the supply of skill will
have a similar decomposition and so will not affect the relative contribution of the
different components of technology.
8 Cross-Country Analysis
In this section we extend our analysis to the ten other OECD countries for which the
available data exists and that we studied in Section 2.47 The changes experienced
by these countries differ quite significantly, both with regard to the change in the
skill premium as well as the change in the relative supply of skilled labor. We view
the results presented here as a simple first pass at extending the analysis to other
countries.
In the interests of space we set ε = 0.10 for all countries and also set ρ = 1.53
as in our benchmark. We take as given the changes in the relative supply of skill
in each country and infer country-specific processes for technical change using the
same procedure described earlier. We choose country-specific values for aG and c̄S
to guarantee that the model generates the amount of structural change found in the
data.48
Using the country-specific calibrated models we carry out a decomposition exercise
for each country corresponding to the results that we previously showed in Table 5.
Results are in Table 8.
47Cross-country data is only available in EUKLEMS, so all of the results in this section use this
data set. In particular, the results in this section for the US are based on EUKLEMS rather than
World KLEMS, which explains why there are small differences from the earlier results. But as we
emphasized earlier, the differences are quite minor.
48In an earlier working paper version of this paper (Buera et al. (2015)) we showed that the
implied series for technical change were quite similar across countries, which we think is reassuring.
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Table 8
Decomposition of ∆wH Due to Technology (%)
∆Aj Only ∆αj Only Interaction
Australia 3.9 86.0 10.1
Austria 21.1 71.8 7.1
Belgium 14.8 84.3 0.9
Denmark 10.0 85.7 4.3
Spain 20.7 75.6 3.7
Germany 21.8 76.9 1.3
Italy 21.3 53.1 25.6
Japan 11.4 83.3 5.3
Netherlands 19.6 79.4 1.0
UK 6.1 69.3 24.6
US 19.7 74.3 6.0
Median 19.6 76.9 3.5
The contribution of changes in the Aj alone varies significantly, from a low of 3.9%
in Australia to a high of 21.8% in Germany. But there is also considerable variation
in the size of the interaction term across countries. If we allocate all of the interaction
term to changes in the Aj then the range varies from a low of 14.0% (Australia and
Denmark) to a high of 46.9% (Italy).
The key message from this brief examination of other countries is that the process
of skill-biased structural change seems to play a significant role in many countries.
9 Conclusion
Using a broad panel of advanced economies, we have documented a systematic ten-
dency for development to be associated with a shift in value added to skill-intensive
sectors. It follows that development is associated with an increase in the relative
demand for high-skill workers. We coined the term skill-biased structural change to
describe this process. We have built a simple two-sector model of structural transfor-
mation and calibrated it to US data over the period 1977 to 2005 in order to assess
the quantitative importance of this mechanism for understanding the large increase
in the skill premium during this period. We find that technical change overall in-
creased the skill premium by roughly 100 percentage points, and that between 18
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and 24 percent of this change is due to the component of technical change that was
sector-specific and skill-neutral, and that this component served to affect the skill
premium through compositional changes. Moreover, this sector-specific skill-neutral
component of technical change was also responsible for all of the structural change
observed in the data.
Our findings have important implications for predicting the future evolution of
the skill premium, since the continued growth of the value-added share of the skill-
intensive sector will exert upward pressure on this premium even in the absence of
skill-biased technological change.
In order to best articulate the mechanism of skill-biased structural change we have
purposefully focused on a simple two-sector model. There is good reason to think that
the mechanism we have highlighted is also at work at a more disaggregated level, so
it is of interest to explore this mechanism in a richer model.
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